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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

WALLACE DUNNIVAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent
-vsJOHN W. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12841

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF' THE NATURE
OF' THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the Defendant-Appellant, John ,V. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison,
from an order granting the relief requested in a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Wallace Dunnivan,
petitioner, the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to Rule 65B ( i), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The writ was granted and Plaintiff-Respon-
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dent was released from his imprisonment m the Utah
State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment and order of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
granting the writ and releasing the respondent from the
Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On N ovemher 5, Hl70, 'Vallace Dunnivan, respon·
dent herein, was found guilty by a jury of Assault ·with
a Deadly \Veapon. The transcript of the proceeding
was admitted into evidence at the habeas corpus hear·
irlg, necessitating reference in this brief to the trial tran·
. t as "'I'" arnl ti1e Ilal>eas corpus t ranscrip
. t as "H".
scrip
Respondent would generally agree with the Statement
of Facts, regarding the evidence at trial, which has been
presented by appellant in his brief, however, respondent
would direct additional facts to the court's attention.
Peggy Dunnivan, former wife of respondent, testi·
fied that the gun, State's Exhibit 1, was brought to her
residence by the respondent and a l\Ir. Hay Hallam (T
126, 127), and she denied having received the same from
George Kinsey and his sister ( T 27). Peggy Dunnivan
further testified that she was on welfare at the time
and was receiving $250.00 a month ( T 44) from the department and on cross-examination acknowledged that
her case worker was in the courtroom and that if she had
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receivc1l any money in addition to that check from any
source, she would be required to reimburse the Welfare
Department ( T 218). She also testified that the respondent seldom gave her money ( T 24) and further
that when he <lid it was to pay her back for a "couple
of dollars here and there" that respondent had borrowed
from her ( T 46). Peggy Dunnivan testified that her
name and her name alone appeared on a ninety-day note
to First Security Bank of Spanish Fork for a truck
which respondent wanted. ( T 48)
At the habeas corpus hearing Dolores Keener and
George Kinsey testified that they were present with
Peggy Dunnivan at the Provo City Dump, when George
Kinsey found a shot gun, State's Exhibit l, and tha.t
Peggy was given the gun and she placed it in the back
of her car. ( H 6, 7, 18, 19) A stipulation was entered
into on the 17th day of February, 1972, between counsel for the appellant and respondent that if Ray Hallam
were called to testify that he would testify that he was
in the company of Peggy Dunnivan, George Kinsey
and Delores Kinsey at the Provo City Dump at which
time Peggy asked for and received a sawed-off shotgun
which had previously been found by George Kinsey. It
was stipulated and made a matter of record that he had
never seen the gun since that time nor did he take the
gun to Peggy Dunnivan's home.
Delores Kinsey and George Kinsey testified that
they had observed respondent give his former wife
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money on many occasions and in varying amounts up to
$500.00 (II 8, 9, 12, rn). The respondent was called
to the stand and testified a ninety-day note at the First
Security Bank of Spanish Fork for his pickup truck
( H 2:3) which note was later received in evidence. (H
24) That note contains the signature of both respondent
and Peggy Dunnivan. (H 23)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT l\IUST REVIEW
THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT l\IOST FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
Respondent contends that the judgment of the trial
court should be upheld if there is a reasonable basis to
support the trial court. In 1l/axrecll v. Turner, 20 Utah
2d 16!-l, 435 P.2d 287 (19G7) this court said at page 165:
Proceedings in habeas corpus are generally
regarded as being civil in nature and consequently follow the same rules of procedure as
in other civil actions. In the original trial the
burden is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts which will
entitle him to relief. On appeal recognition is
g'iYen to the prerogatives and the advantaged
position of the trial court. His findings and
judgment are indulged a presumption of the
correctness. It is our duty to survey the evi-
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<lence in the light most favorable to them and
not to upset them if they find any substantial
support in the evidence.
This court has also held in Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah
2cl 2:rn, 44:3 P .2d 1020, ( 1968) that the judgment
will not be reversed if there is a reasonable basis therein
to support the trial court. See also Brown v. Turner, 21
Utah2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), which announced a
similar standards.
This court, then, must review the trial court's findings, which findings stated that respondent's conviction
was base<l on perjured testimony, in a light most favorable to them and presume them to be correct, if there is
any reasonable evidence to support them. The trial court
hatl the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses
demeanor and deportment while on the witness stand and
to evaluate the evidence presented at trial. Respondent
contends the perjured testimony of Peggy Dunnivan
most certainly would have an impact on the critical element of intent which the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt at .Mr. Dunnivan's trial. The
Findings of Fact of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson
set forth that perjured testimony was used to obtain
the conviction. The court also found that the perjury
went to a material element of the crime when the court
found that the conviction was based on perjured testimony. Respondent submits that without question there is
reasonable evidence to support those findings and the
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order of the court granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus
should be affirmed.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS '
NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT TO
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THE
PERJURED TESTIMONY WAS KNO\VINGLY USED BY THE PROSECUTION.

\Vhile it is a well accepted doctrine of law that the
knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution
violates due process of law thus making the conviction
a nulity Napue v. Illinois, 2 L.Ed.2d 1587 360 U.S.
264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (19.59); Alcorta v. ,
Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (19.57);
1Fild v. State of Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 ( 1951) ; there
is also authority that although it is not shown that the
State procesuting officers knew that the testimony was
perjured at the time of the trial, the petitioner is still
entitled to relief if he can establish that perjured testi·
rnony was used to obtain his conviction. In Jones v. Com·
monwcalth of Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 ( 1938), the defendant was convicted of murdering his wife and was
sentenced to death. Newly discovered evidence offered
to the state court cast grave doubt upon the competency
and freedom from duress of one witness and upon the
veracity of both the prosecution's principle witnesses.
Defendant was denied relief on writs in State court and
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also in the District Court of the United States for the
Western District of Kentucky and he appealed. That
court reversed and remanded saying at page 338:
... the foundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions must with equal abhorrence condemn as a travisty a conviction upon perjured
testimony if later, but fortunately not too late
its falseness is discovered, and that the state in
one case as in the other is required to afford a
corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged irony, if consitutional rights are not to
he impaired.

In Montgomery t'. Pagen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (1949), the
court recognized Jones, supra, and cited part of that
opinion but ultimately granted the petition for habeas
corpus upon the ground that at least some of the prosecuting officers knew at the time that a witness was committing perjury. See also Kelsy v. Ragan, 129 F.2d
811 ( 1942) where the court recognized Jones, supra, but
decided the case on other grounds.
Respondent submits that there is authority for the
position that the State need not know that perjured
testimony was used to obtain a conviction to constitute a
violation to due process. Indeed it is most difficult if
not impossible under some circumstances to establish
that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony.
However, the lower court has found that respondent's
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conviction \Vas based on perjured testimony. To require
respondent to prove that perjured testimony was know.
ingly used would be to put form before substance and
legal technicalities before justice, for the legal distinc·
tions to a man incarceration in a state institution for a
conviction based upon perjury are meaningless. Nor
should the state take any consulation from a conviction
based upon unknowingly using perjured testimony any
more than one in which they knew perjured testimony
was used. The State originated the proceeding that
placed respondent in jeopardy and the state should in·
sure that he should not be incarcerated as a result of per·
jury whether knowingly or unknowingly used. The
judgment and order of the lower court should be af·
firmed.

POINT III
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE
HIS HIGHT TO CLAil\l A DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION BY THE USE OF PERJURED
TESTIMONY.
'\Thile it is clear that the right to challenge a con·
viction based upon perjured testimony in a subsequent
Habeas Corpus proceedings may be waived, that waiver
results from inaction or the absence of any attempt to
rebutt the perjured testimony. lJlcGuinn v. U.S., App
D.C. 286, 239 F.2d 449, cert den 353 U.S. 942, 1
L.Ed.2d 762, 77 S.Ct. 818 ( 1956); Taylor v. U.S., 229
F .2d 826, cert den 351 U.S. 986, 100 L.Ed. 1500, 76
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S.Ct. l 055 ( 1956, CA8 1\10.). The cases cited above are
based upon the theory that an individual cannot remain
silent as to the situation during the trial and after his
conviction attempt to set the judgment aside by collateral atta.ck. In 3lcGuinn v. U.S., 239 F.2d 449 at
page 451 the court denied relief setting forth its reasoning:
If that testimony was false, appellant knew it
at the trial but made no attempt to demonstrate
it by cross examination, by his own testimony or
by that of rebutting witnesses, who were as
readily available then as now. Appellant must
be regarded as having waived this objection.

Also in Ta,ljlor v. U.S., 229 F.2d at page 833 the court
similarly ruled the silence on the part of the petitioner
operated as a waiver:
The accused is fully entitled to present, at his
trial, all evidence in defense of which he has
actual knowledge at the time. He cannot remain silent as to such thus hoping to gain an
acquittal on the evidence actually presented and
thereafter expect to have a second trial and
chance for acquittal on evidence he has knowingly concealed at the time of trial. He must be
deemed to have waived his rights because of
such inaction.
Respondent submits that he did not waive his right
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to challenge his conviction by collateral attack. Contrary
to the facts in the cases 111 cGuinn and Taylor, supra,
.Mr. '\T allace did not remain silent when perjured testimony was introduced by the state. Respondent's counsel
cross-examined Paggy Dunnivan as to money given her
by respondent (T. 24, 25, 26, 128, 129) regardingwhere
the gun came from ( T. 27, 28, 130) and concerning respondent's cosigning the note for the truck (T. 47-48).
Petitioner personally testified that he had given Peggy
money prior to that day, (T. 96, 98) that he had not
seen the gun prior to that day (T. 103, 108), and that
he had co-signed the note for the truck. (T. 97) Cer·
tainly it cannot be argued that respondent concealed
testimony or remained silent when the perjured testi·
mony was introduced at the time of trial. Respondent
attempted to rebutt the perjured testimony of his former wife during the course of the trial by every reason·
able means available to him at the time. The facts of this
case do not justify a ruling that petitioner waived his
right to challenge his conviction by a collateral remedy.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
IN ORDERING THE RELEASE OF THE RE·
SPONDENT.
The legislature of the State of Utah has provided
statutory procedure to be followed in the event relief is
granted to the petitioner. Rule 65B (i) 8 provides:
If the court finds in favor of the complainant,

1
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it shall enter an appropriate order with respect
to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such further order with respect
to rearraignments, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper
in the case.
The statute grants discretion to the court to issue the
appropriate order in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. The legislature also specifically
delegates the authority to discharge in those cases in
which the court deems that course of action to be the
proper remedy. The order of the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson, after a consideraion of the evidence, has signed
an order on the 18th day of February, 1972, ordering
the respondent's release.
Appellant has cited the case of Chapman v. Graham, 2 Utah2d 156, 270 P.2d 821 (1954), as authority
for the proposition that the court erred in granting respondent' s release without delay. In that case the court
consiclered the question of whether it was cruel and unusual punishment for prison officials to return petitioner
to Utah from another state before completion of surgery. The court held that it was not cruel and unusual
punishment and then went on to state that "we are constrained to suggest that in this case" the court more
properly could have made petitioner's discharge conditional upon affirmation on appeal or upon releasing
him on bail, but then stated:
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Both procedures we have approved, although
we are aware that a <lifferent conclusion was
reached in early cases touching the matter.
Respondent contends that Chapman, supra, was
limited to the facts of that case and further that it is
distinguishable from his case in that the facs and decisions of Chapman did not go to the validity of a con·
viction, nor was there any contention that the conviction
was unlawful in any way. Respondent submits that when
the court found that his conviction was based upon per·
jured testimony the court properly ordered his release in
without delay.

CONCLUSION
The judgment and order of the lower court that
respondent's conviction was based upon perjured testi·
mony and that he be released without delay should be
given the presumption of correctness it is entitled to
under the law, and the order of the lower court granting
the writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

F. JOHN HILL
Attorney for Respondent

